Introduction
Municipal transport systems are such systems whose aim is to carry out transport tasks over an assigned area, with the use of transport means. The main requirements that must be met by such systems are:
-transport safety, -transport means reliability, -transport punctuality, -proper frequency of carried out transports, -proper standard of offered services. The operation area of the municipal transport also includes suburbs which are beyond the administrative borders of the city though performing similar functions as town districts. The most popular kind of municipal transport is bus transport due to the fact that it does not require additional tracts or railroads, moreover, this kind of transportation provides a possibility of changing routes along which these transport tasks are accomplished. These systems are examples of socio-technical systems of the type HumanTechnical Object-Environment -H-TO-E, in which accomplishment of transport tasks is the direct responsibility of an executive subsystem consisting of elementary subsystems of the type -human -technical object (operator -transport means) carrying out tasks in the system surroundings. Due to presence of people in the system, the most significant criterion for assessment of the accomplished transport tasks is their operation safety. Action is a notion referring to the human, action means human behavior (external and internal act, its omission or suppression) if the one who acts or many who act, associate some subjective sense with it. According to the author of paper [4] there are four kinds of actions:
 action rational in terms of the goal, when the acting individuals are motivated by instrumental rationality: the subject chooses goals from a set of values and matches appropriate means taking into consideration alternative costs and benefits  action rational in terms of values, in contrast to the above, the acting individuals are not motivated by calculation of the action consequences ( according to the rule 'the end justifies the means')  affectionate action, corresponding to current emotional states,  traditional action, basing on habitual behavior
In work (Watusiński, 1980) , technical actions have been defined as oriented to achieving a goal. set by the man. Technical action requires previous intellectual preparation, not always immediately specified. Functioning, however, is a notion which refers to machines (technical objects). Analyzing socio-technical systems H-TO-E, it can be said that these systems operate thanks to the role people play in them. Operation safety of a municipal bus transport system is its state for which values of identified features, describing the system in a fixed time t, [t , t], remain within established boundaries with defined levels of the impact of forcing factors. These factors can be divided into (Woropay, et. al., 2008; Szpytko and Kocerba, 2008) :
 operational -forcing factors which affect the transport means in result of performing useful functions  external -forcing factors characterizing the impact of the environment on the transport means ( not conditioned by its functioning)  antropotechnical -forcing factors affecting the transport means in result of human actions, eg the operator' mistakes A negative impact of these factors is the cause of occurrence of undesirable events in transport systems.
The Research Object
The research object is a bus transport system in a big urban agglomeration, which is a socio-technical system of the type Human-Technical ObjectEnvironment <H-TO-E> whose main task is safe transport of a given number of people over an assigned area with the use of transport means utilized in this system.
The Research Goal
Providing the municipal bus transport, being the whole of means and actions connected with transport of people, with high level of safety is a key problem due to vast numbers of people carried by transport means, high intensity of traffic, and poor infrastructure of roads along which the transport tasks are performed. For this reason, the authors have assumed an identification of events undesirable in the municipal bus transport system, as the research goal. This provides the basis for taking rational actions aiming at reduction of the number of these events and minimization of their negative effects.
Identification of Undesirable Events
An event is a change or duration of a state in moment (Woropay and Muślewski, 2005) . In this work an undesirable event has been defined as an event which leads to occurrence of material damages or injuries of people who are present in the system or in its environment. For his reason, there has been made a classification of possible undesirable events, on the basis of the following criteria:
-kind of the event -place of the event -cause of the event Figure 1 presents classification of undesirable events according to their kinds. There can be distinguished the following events:
 Road collision -an event which caused only material damages.  Road accident -an event occurred within a road space in result of which at least one person was dead or sustained injuries..  Vehicle devastation -conscious behavior of people (passengers) aiming at damaging the vehicle.  Damage to the vehicle -exceeding admissible boundary values by features describing the vehicle, causing change of its state from the usability state to the limited usability state or unfitness for use.
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Fig.1 Classification of undesirable events
On the basis of experimental tests carried out within the bus transport system, in a big urban agglomeration, the percentage of particular events in the set of all the undesirable events, was established as well as the percentage of undesirable events in the set of all occurred events according to the place of their occurrence; results of experimental tests have been presented in fig. 2 and 4.
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Fig.2 Percentage of particular events in the set of all occurred undesirable events
In figure 3 Classification of undesirable events according to the place of their occurrence, place of undesirable event occurrence
PLACE OF UNDESIRABLE EVENTOCCURENCE
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Inside the vehicle The next classification of undesirable events is a classification according to the causes of undesirable events occurrence.
Having made a detailed analysis of causes of a road event occurrence, each of the forcing factors can be divided into an array of undesirable factors accounting for causes of these events occurrences. A detailed classification of causes has been presented in figure 5 .
Analyzing a road event and the cause of its occurrence it is necessary to consider primary criteria of the event occurrence ( the main cause), and then second -rate criterion (criteria). Then, providing the assessment criteria of operation safety, it is possible to see the cause of the analyzed undesirable event occurrence. A precise identification of undesirable events occurrence causes, is a basis for elaboration of the system operation safety state diagnosis algorithm.
Such an algorithm has been presented in figure 6 . 
Assessment Algorithm of a Municipal Road Transport System Operation Safety
The algorithm presented in figure 5 reflects the procedure for the process of a road transport system operation safety assessment, taking into consideration the impact of primary forcing factors whose impact sequences have been presented in table 2.
In this algorithm there can be identified three basic members being constituent algorithms: A,B,C applying successively to: algorithm A -concerning the transport means operation safety, algorithm B -concerning assessment of the system environment impact on its operation safety, algorithm C -concerning assessment of the impact of people present in the system and its environment on the system operation safety. Particular component algorithms A, B and C determine an overall way of the transport system operation safety assessment. Table 3 shows a description of particular blocks of the algorithm. 
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Table3. Description of general blocks of the transport system operation safety.
The block code
The code description 1 Determine a set of road events occurred in the analyzed time period Zi;i={1,2,4….,k}.
2
Choose an event significant from the point of view of the analyzed system operation safety. 3
Rank events according to the date of occurrence Z , Z , Z ….Z. 4
Choose for assessment the first event Z i=1 5
Choose for assessment the successive road event Z + 1 A Was a damage to the transport means subsystem the cause of a road event?
A1
Establish criteria for assessment of the damage significance A2
Make an assessment of the damaged subsystem.
A3
Is the damaged subsystem significant in terms of the transport system operation safety?
A4
Had the damage to a significant subsystem an impact on incorrect behavior of the operator?
A5
Evaluate the level of transport means usability state changes as the effect of the analyzed subsystem damage.
A6
Make collective evaluation of the transport system operation safety A7 Evaluate the costs due to the events occurred A8
Determine the transport means operation safety assessment criteria A9
Establish the transport means operation safety assessment criteria A10 Has the analyzed event Z=Z where i={1,2,3,…k} A11 Is the resultant model adequate? A12 Check if B event occurred as well?
B
Was the impact of the environment a cause of the analyzed event occurrence?
B1
Was the road poor surface the cause of the analyzed event occurrence?
B11
Was the road poor surface the cause of a damage to the transport means? B2 Was a poor road infrastructure the cause of the road event occurrence?
B21
Was the road poor infrastructure the cause of the transport means damage?
B3
Was the impact of weather conditions the cause of the road event occurrence?
B31
Was the impact of weather conditions the cause of inappropriate actions of people present in the system and its surroundings? Table 4 Description of general blocks of the transport system operation safety asessment algorithm. The block code
The code description B4 Determine a set of indexes for assessment of the environment safe impact on people and transport means? 
C4
Were inappropriate behaviors of people present in the subsystem responsible for ensuring usability the cause of the event occurrence? C41 Were inappropriate actions of diagnostics the cause of the road event?
C411
Were inappropriate actions of diagnostics the cause of the driver's incorrect behavior?
C42
Were inappropriate actions of mechanics the cause of the event occurrence?
C421
Were inappropriate actions of mechanics the cause of the driver's wrong behavior?
C5
Determine a set of indexes for an assessment of undesirable impact of people present in the transport system and its environment.
C6
Establish criteria for an assessment of a safe impact of people present in the transport system and its environment. Table 4 Description of general blocks of the transport system operation safety asessment algorithm.
C7
Choose a set of representative indexes for an assessment of the impact of people present in the transport system and its environment.
C8
Make an assessment of safe impact of people present in the transport system and its environment.
C9
Is the analyzed event Zi=Zk where i={1,2,….,k} C10 Is the resultant model adequate?
6 Make a summary assessment of the transport means operation safety. 7
Show the result The next step of the transport system operation safety assessment is determination of a criterion for the system safe operation. For this purpose it is necessary to determine a set of measurable features X (i=1,2,…,n) and a set of significant non-measurable features X (j=1,2,…,m), describing the system in terms of its operation safety. Next, it is necessary to determine, for each of measurable features, admissible boundaries And similarly, it is necessary to set, for each of non -measurable features, criteria enabling to establish correctly whether a given feature corresponds to conditions of safe operation of the system. Such a state can be symbolically recorded X =1, whereas, the opposite case X =0. Then, the condition of the System Safe Operation in a given time t,t [t t] can be presented in the following way:
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